The law of neutrality and the principle of non-intervention both promulgate neutrality norms pertaining to third-state assistance for belligerent parties embroiled in an international or non-international armed conflict. This article compares and contrasts these two legal frameworks and assesses whether they work in perfect harmony or, on the contrary, establish different standards of behaviour depending on the type of armed conflict. Additionally, by approaching both regulatory frameworks simultaneously, conceptual uncertainties hindering their effective application in practice can be clarified. It is submitted that by adopting such a holistic approach, fresh insights are offered on the "duty of neutrality", sensu lato, during armed conflicts under international law.
I. Introduction 1. While the neutral character of international law in general is subject to debate, 1 there are two international legal doctrines that can hardly be accused of challenging it. First, the body of law that specifies the rights and duties of neutral and belligerent States during international armed conflicts (IACs)-aptly dubbed the "law of neutrality"-and, second, the principle of non-intervention that, inter alia, prohibits third-state intervention during non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).
2. It is submitted that both doctrines share a common purpose and core. First, both aim to maintain peace, friendly relations and a balance of power between States.
2 Second, that aim is achieved by a set of norms limiting the interference by third States in the internal and external affairs of other States. More specifically, a neutral stance is imposed on third States during an IAC by neutrality law, while foreign, pro-rebel interventions during a NIAC are prohibited by the non-intervention principle. Together, they thus form a "legal firewall" against outside interference during armed conflicts.
3. This article compares and contrasts both legal frameworks to assess whether the neutrality norms they promulgate work in perfect harmony or, on the contrary, establish different standards of behaviour for third-state action depending on the type of armed conflict. Additionally, by approaching both regulatory frameworks simultaneously, theoretical uncertainties hindering their effective application in practice can be clarified. It is submitted that by adopting such a holistic approach, fresh insights are offered on the "duty of neutrality", sensu lato, during armed conflicts under international law.
4. To that effect, the article is structured as follows: First, it lays out the current state of affairs by conducting four case studies on armed conflicts that have occurred in the past fifteen years or are still ongoing (Section II). Second, it (succinctly) revisits the applicable legal frameworks and highlights some of their conceptual difficulties through the legal evaluation of the aforementioned cases (Section III). Third, it compares and contrasts how international law mandates a neutral stance for third States during IACs and NIACs based upon the previous two sections. As a result, it provides a revamped account of these classical legal doctrines (Section IV). Finally, the paper ends with some tentative observations, while pinpointing the areas in need of additional research (Section V). space. 7 However, Italy explicitly prohibited the "participation in military actions by the Italian armed forces", the "supply and provision of armaments or military vehicles of any kind" and the "use of military structures [on Italian territory] as a basis for direct attacks on Iraqi targets". 8 As a justification for its support to one side of the conflict, the Italian Supreme Defence Council attempted to creatively apply neutrality law by invoking a so-called status of non-belligerency. 9 8. In addition, numerous other States offered some type of support for the military operation, justified by a general reference to "practice between allies" and/or obligations under the NATO treaty. 10 For instance, France granted overflight rights, even though it had strongly opposed the Iraq invasion before the Security Council. 11 The then French Foreign Affairs Minister, Dominique de Villepin, explained to the Assemblée Nationale that " [France] wants the war to be as short and least lethal possible [and] the countries of the region to abstain from any involvement in the conflict."
II. Neutrality during armed conflicts: a reality check
12 However, he admitted that "some practices between allies exist, which [France] needs to respect." 13 9. Similarly, although Germany strongly opposed the war, 14 it nevertheless provided overflight rights for American and British military aircraft and authorized its own military to monitor the Turkish-Iraqi border with AWACS aircraft. The German government justified this support by reference to the NATO treaty and bilateral agreements with the US. 15 However, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) did not agree with that justification. 16 After referring to 18 The Court specified that the obligations certainly included a prohibition on granting "cross-border rights for US and UK military aircraft" and the "admission of troops, the transport of weapons and military supplies from German soil to the war zone". 19 Since the "purpose of these measures was to facilitate or even to promote the military action of the USA and the UK", the Court held that the supportive measures raised "serious concerns" in light of Hague Convention V. 20 10. For two other types of support, namely the deployment of AWACS flights over Turkey and the role of German soldiers in protecting US barracks on German territory, the Court's analysis was more measured. With regard to the former, the compliance with neutrality law "[depended] on whether the data obtained during these operations were of importance for the war operations in Iraq and whether the US and UK forces had de facto access to them", whereas for the latter it depended on whether these tasks were taken over from US soldiers "in order to enable or facilitate the withdrawal of the respective troops into the war zone". 21 If that were the case, these supportive acts would also not be compatible with the prohibition under neutrality law of supporting a belligerent party. 11. In addition, Ireland offered similar support by allowing US aircraft to use the Shannon airport for stop-overs on their way to Iraq. During the parliamentary debate, the government contended it did "not regard the provision of landing and overflight facilities to foreign aircraft as participating in a war". 23 More specifically, it argued that "the provision of facilities does not make Ireland a member of a military coalition nor does anybody regard us as such. [Ireland] of troops or munitions of one belligerent State through its territory en route to a theatre of war with another. 25 12. Finally, Kuwait allowed its territory to be used as a basis for coalition attacks against neighbouring Iraq to which the latter responded by launching missiles against the former.
26 Saudi Arabia declared that it "[would] not participate in any way" in the war against Iraq, but nevertheless allowed the US to make use of its Prince Sultan Air Base. 27 No evidence was found of similar retaliating military action by Iraq against Saudi Arabia or any of the European States offering support to the coalition.
13. In sum, the 2003 invasion of Iraq features multiple examples of third-state support to one side of the IAC as well as some refusals thereof. States that provided assistance in violation of neutrality law justified their actions by reference to "practices between (NATO) allies" (France, Germany, Ireland) or by arguing that an intermediate status of non-belligerency exists (Italy). Some other States refused to provide any type of assistance, thereby explicitly referring to their neutral obligations or their (politically) neutral position. Nevertheless, at least two of the assisting States were later confronted with domestic judgments indicating (ex post facto) violations of neutral duties (Germany and Ireland). On one occasion, the assisting third State (Kuwait) was even the victim of armed reprisals by the aggrieved belligerent. In addition, there were clear examples of neutrality law violations that have remained without judicial or military consequences. Importantly, however, none of the assisting States overtly set aside neutrality law or denied its application. 15. However, assistance by the US qualified as the lone exception in this context. On 8 August 2008, the US delivered "disaster packages" which included "basic medical supplies, tents, blankets, bedding, hygiene items, clothing, beds and cots", whereas on 10 August $250,000 were provided for the "procurement and distribution of emergency relief supplies". 33 Moreover, and more conspicuously, the US airlifted the Georgian troops who were operating in Iraq back to Georgia. 34 As this happened on 10 and 11 August, while the conflict was still ongoing, it could be regarded as a violation of neutral duties by the US. Nonetheless, the law of neutrality was neither invoked by third States as a justification for the general abstention in providing support to the "victim of aggression" (Georgia), nor used by Russia to condemn the (possible) illegality of the limited US action. In conclusion, the Russo-Georgian war did not witness as many examples of third-state assistance in violation of the law of neutrality as was the case for the Iraq invasion. While most States abstained from assisting either side of the conflict, the US did provide aid but stressed it was of a purely humanitarian nature. The US also airlifted Georgian soldiers home from Iraq, without pronouncing on the legality of that action under neutrality law, whereas Russia did not invoke any violation of neutrality law, nor did it adopt any type of retaliatory action.
II
II.C. The Syrian Civil War 17. The Syrian Civil War provides abundant examples of third-state assistance to both sides of the non-international armed conflict pitting the ruling regime led by President Bashar al-Assad against multiple armed opposition groups. 36 A variety of "terrorist" (as opposed to "rebel" or "opposition") groups are moreover involved, 37 adding a dimension to the conflict with significant legal relevance. However, the casestudy is narrowed by looking in particular at the aid provided by the US and (members of the) EU to the Syrian armed opposition. 38 This particular focus is justified because the principle of non-intervention arguably does not apply in the context of third-state assistance upon request by the internationally legitimate government, without thereby arguing that such assistance is necessarily lawful under international law. Consequently, third-state support to the Syrian armed forces will not further be discussed here. 39 Record, UN Doc. S/PV.5951 (8 August 2008), 4/9. As Georgia does not consider South Ossetia to be an independent State, this statement can hardly be interpreted as a reference to neutrality law (which only applies when armed conflicts between States occur). 18. During the course of the Syrian civil war, the US has come out as one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-Government armed forces. 40 It has openly boasted about spending more than $6.5 billion on humanitarian assistance since the start of the conflict, 41 as well as providing "vetted" members of the armed opposition forces with so-called non-lethal assistance. 42 The latter type encompassed "transition assistance" to create the conditions for an eventual political transition (including civil administration training programs and critical equipment) and "direct non-lethal assistance" to help defend against attacks by the regime and violent extremist groups (including food baskets, medical supplies, communications equipment, vehicles and other basic supplies). 43 In addition, there were regular reports of US lethal aid to select opposition groups. 44 However, at least some action to that effect was taken under "covert action authorities", 45 which intended to obfuscate the role of the US government. 46 It appears that US officials have indeed avoided openly admitting to providing such support to date, though there are some (notable) exceptions. conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria". 48 The joint explanatory statement adds that "sustainment [. . .] includes the provision of [. . .] arms, munitions, and equipment". 49 This legislation, part of the so-called Syrian Train and Equip Program, thus-at least in theory-allows the provision of lethal aid, including for the benefit of the Syrian armed opposition groups in their armed resistance to the Assad regime. However, it seems that-in practice-the program was (and remains) fundamentally geared towards the fight against the Islamic State. 50 Indeed, although the NDAA 2017 extended the authorization for the Syria training programme through 31 December 2018, it also transferred the funds for the former Syria and Iraq "Train and Equip Funds" to a new "Counter-ISIL Fund". 51 20. Turning to European practice, more than e9.4 billion has been spent by the EU on humanitarian aid. 52 Conversely, the Council of the EU implemented an arms embargo on Syria on 9 May 2011. 53 However, an exception was made for "non-lethal military equipment" and "equipment which might be used for internal repression" if "intended solely for humanitarian or protective use". 54 The embargo was eased significantly in February 2013, 55 and finally lifted for the benefit of the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces in May of the same year. 57 That Council Common Position does not explicitly prohibit transferring arms to non-state armed groups embroiled in civil war, but does prescribe that an export license shall be denied if it would be inconsistent with member States' international obligations or would prolong armed conflicts in the country of final destination. 58 However, lifting an arms embargo does not (necessarily) imply that arms transfers are lawful. For example, the Dutch Government maintained that, although there was no international obligation to impose an arms embargo on Syria, the non-intervention principle still applied and included a prohibition on "supporting the armed opposition through the provision of military material and training". 21. In any event, no EU member State seems to have overtly admitted sending war material to the Syrian armed opposition. 60 While the UK confessed to having provided more than £67 million to the Syrian opposition, most of those funds have (officially) been allocated to rather innocuous support. 61 Even sending life-saving equipment to the moderate armed opposition-including communications, medical and logistics equipment, as well as equipment to protect against chemical weapons attacks-does not immediately raise any red flags. In a similar sense, then French President François Hollande hinted at having provided arms to the Syrian rebels, but maintained that the support was in accordance with European commitments. 64 However, the exporting States seemed to rely on assurances provided by the beneficiaries that the arms would not be resold or exported. 65 22. Finally, in support of their decision not to export weapons to Syria, several European States expressed the view that the supply of arms to the Syrian opposition would (likely) be in breach of the customary principle of non-intervention and thus illegal under international law. 66 23. Looking at this practice, two elements stand out. First, the US and EU member States did not seem to have any qualms about admitting their support for organized armed groups in Syria, as long as it pertained to humanitarian aid. 67 Second, although the necessary authorization was adopted in the US and the EU arms embargo on Syria was eventually (partially) lifted, no State openly admitted to providing (lethal or non-lethal) military aid to the Syrian armed opposition directed towards its fight against the Assad regime. If assistance for military purposes was in fact (grudgingly) acknowledged, the "anti-terrorist" features thereof were highlighted where possible. 68 24. Furthermore, the Syrian government reacted furiously to the involvement of third States, evidenced by its numerous letters to the UNSC on the topic. 69 86 President Putin signed a decree dedicated to the intention not to become a party to the Court. 87 Maria Zakharova, the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, explained that the report's depiction of the situation in southeast Ukraine was "biased" and lambasted its sources. 88 Finally, after an international investigation concluded that the MH17 flight was downed by a missile launcher brought into Ukraine from Russia, 89 Zakharova again called the allegations "groundless and unsubstantiated", while pointing at the investigation's "poor quality". 90 29. On two separate occasions, however, President Putin came close to admitting Russian involvement. First, on 17 December 2015, he stated during his annual press conference that: "We've never said there are no people there who deal with certain matters, including in the military area, but this does not mean that regular Russian troops are present there."
91 Second, on 12 October 2016, he admitted Russia "had-to reiterate, had-to defend the Russian-speaking population in Donbass".
92 Regardless of these statements, no direct admissions of involvement have surfaced to date.
30. In sum, and similar to the Syrian case study, Russian officials were upfront about their intentions to support the population in eastern Ukraine by providing humanitarian assistance. However, they have not (publicly) accepted responsibility for additional Russian interference. This included downplaying Russian-made equipment being used by the separatist forces, as well as the relationship between Russian citizens active in the conflict and their ties to the Russian State. 
III. Revisiting the applicable legal frameworks
31. Following an overview of recent and ongoing armed conflicts, and the interference therein by non-belligerent parties, the following section is dedicated to the evaluation of such practice on the basis of the applicable legal frameworks, i.e., the law of neutrality (for IACs) and the principle of non-intervention (for NIACs).
Concomitantly, some of their conceptual difficulties are highlighted and clarified. 33. The basic rules of neutrality law all derive from the principles of impartiality, abstention and prevention, and include rights and duties for both neutral and belligerent States. Neutral States are prohibited from participating in the hostilities and providing assistance to the belligerent parties, while being bound by a duty of impartiality. More specifically, a neutral State may not allow the use of its territory by one of the belligerents, including allowing overflights or stopovers for military planes or the installation or use of "wireless telegraph stations". 98 granting overflight rights indeed forms a violation of the law of neutrality. The only exception would be allowing overflight for humanitarian purposes, as the example of Switzerland during the Iraq war correctly indicates. While the Irish government was perhaps right in saying that allowing US planes to land at Shannon airport does not equal an Irish "participation in the war", such supportive actions nevertheless violated the law of neutrality.
III.A. The law of neutrality
35. The corollary of these neutral duties is the neutral State's right to have its territory respected by the belligerents, meaning that combatants may not enter that territory (Article 1 HC V) and that belligerents may not recruit troops on the territory of a neutral State (Article 4 HC V). If a combatant enters the territory of a neutral State, that State has the duty to capture and intern him (Articles 11 and 12 HC V). Thus, if a third State allows a military base to be used by a belligerent on the neutral territory, as Italy did during the 2003 Iraq war, it violates the law of neutrality.
36. Furthermore, neutrality law clearly prohibits the provision of war material by neutral States to belligerents (Art. 6 HC XIII). 99 Even though it does not contain specific norms related to the provision of other types of support, the prohibition of assistance is considered to include also financial aid, such as gifts and loans, 100 or the provision of services that could influence the outcome of the conflict, such as intelligence sharing. 101 As helping troops to return from a different battlefield to fight in a newly erupted IAC arguably influences the outcome of that IAC, the US assistance in airlifting Georgian troops from Iraq to Georgia in 2008 constituted a violation of neutrality law. Nevertheless, this observation does not exclude the fact that under the rules of jus ad bellum, as enshrined in the UN Charter, States are entitled to assist a victim of aggression in collective self-defence. 37. An important and undisputed exception to the foregoing is the provision of humanitarian aid, which falls outside the scope of the prohibition of assistance (Art. 14 HC V). It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the US stressed it was only providing humanitarian aid to Georgia during the IAC with Russia. The law of neutrality also does not prohibit States from maintaining trade relations with belligerents, as long as it does so in an impartial way (Art. 9 HC V). Restrictions on trade between neutral and belligerent States may however flow from other obligations, such as UNSC Resolutions.
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38. The combination of both neutral rights and duties forms a source of uncertainty and discontent with regard to neutrality law. Indeed, States have occasionally expressed the desire to enjoy neutral rights without having to comply with the full range of neutral duties. Hence, such a stance would bring States in a grey zone between being neutral and being belligerent, which has been labelled by scholars as "qualified neutrality", 102 "differentiated neutrality", "benevolent neutrality" or "nonbelligerency". 103 39. The notion of non-belligerency was introduced by Italy in 1939, when it initially decided not to take part in the Second World War but nevertheless supported Germany. 104 The US also claimed to be a non-belligerent during the Second World War before entering the war. 105 Non-belligerent States willingly abandon their duty of impartiality and non-assistance, respecting only the duty of non-participation in the hostilities. 106 In doing so, they hope to keep the protection offered to neutrals, 111 In its recent LOAC Manual, the US defends the "qualified belligerent" theory, but only in case it is used in support of a victim of aggression, while nevertheless also admitting it is "controversial". 112 In sum, a status of non-belligerency has not widely been recognized in legal doctrine, 113 and finds only very limited support in State practice. As one author aptly summed it up: "whenever an IAC breaks out, States are either belligerent or neutral". 42. Both in doctrine and practice, uncertainty nevertheless exists with regard to possible (forcible) countermeasures that can be taken against violations of neutrality law. In the Charter era, forcible countermeasures may only be taken by way of measure of self-defence in reaction to an armed attack in accordance with Article 51 UN Charter. If the violation of neutrality law by the neutral State does not amount to an armed attack, the aggrieved belligerent cannot react with force. This would lead to the conclusion that the armed reprisals adopted by Iraq against Kuwait in 2003, in retaliation for the latter's support to the US-led coalition, could at least not be justified by reference to violations of the law of neutrality.
43. However, UNSC-imposed obligations, such as an arms embargo, can temporarily suspend neutral obligations, hence removing the existence of a wrongful act in the first place and thereby excluding any type of countermeasure by the aggrieved belligerent. Controversy remains as to whether UNSC authorizations lead to the same effect. For instance, if the Iraq invasion in 2003 would have been authorized by the UNSC, then granting overflight to the US would arguably not have been considered problematic. 44. To summarize, providing the type of support as discussed under Section II (except for the humanitarian assistance) would clearly violate neutral duties. While some States explicitly recognized this-and therefore refused to provide such assistanceothers have tried to deny it by wrongfully invoking an intermediate status of nonbelligerency or by claiming that multi-or bilateral agreements between allies would prevail over neutrality rules-something which has been contested by national courts.
45. Nevertheless, there are some examples of support in violation of neutrality law which have remained without consequences, leaving us with inconsistent practice as regards the application of neutrality law. However, at no point was this prima facie unlawful behaviour accompanied by the necessary opinio juris to be able to argue a change in customary international law. As such, the traditional understanding of the law of neutrality (inasmuch as it has not been altered by the UN Charter) remains standing.
III.B. The principle of non-intervention 46. Complementary to neutrality law, though not applicable to international armed conflicts, is the principle of non-intervention that has classically been described as follows:
[I]ntervention is forcible or dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state. [. . .] Since every state has the right, as an attribute of its sovereignty and insofar as it is not qualified by treaty obligations, to decide for itself such matters as its political, economic, social and cultural systems, and its foreign policy, interference in those matters can infringe its sovereignty. Two conditions thus need to be met for a violation of the non-intervention principle: State action must constitute coercive interference in another State's domaine réservé. 49. Consequently, it is, first, submitted that the principle of non-intervention in se does not frustrate a government-in-distress from soliciting (military) support from an allied government in quelling a NIAC. The norm embodies the "right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference" and qualifies as the "corollary of the principle of sovereign equality of States".
124 As the right is borne by the State, represented by its internationally recognized government, it logically cannot qualify as a legal impediment to foreign assistance if so requested by that government.
125 It is indeed difficult to see how such assistance could be described as 52. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that the previous section describing modern State practice seems to capture a more pragmatic trend in international relations whereby third-state support to rebel groups, fighting the government-in-power, is not considered unlawful as long as it serves humanitarian or non-military purposes only. As such, it diverges from the Nicaragua acquis which prohibits even humanitarian assistance which is not "given without discrimination to all in need". 135 Generally, however, the trend seems to correspond to the Wiesbaden Resolution, which prohibits pro-rebel forcible (e.g., through armed forces or the supply of war material) and dictatorial interference (e.g., through financial, economic or technical support which is likely to influence or have a substantial impact on the outcome of the armed conflict).
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53. However, with regard to military support, it is equally clear that the sponsoring States showed an absolute unwillingness to accept responsibility for their actions, 137 except when it was aimed at fighting a group that is internationally branded as a terrorist organization. 138 This also matches with the classical understanding of the nonintervention principle, given that it solely proscribes support aimed at the violent overthrow of the internationally recognized government. As a consequence, the practice can have no bearing on the traditional interpretation of the non-intervention principle, as prima facie violations without accompanying opinio juris leave intact the prohibition on assisting rebel armed forces through military means.
54. In sum, the combination of (1) the refusal by US officials to specify the types of lethal support and their broad reliance upon "covert action authority", (2) the evasive reaction or outright denial of any Russian involvement in supporting the rebels in southeastern Ukraine, (3) the absence of overt State practice by European States, (4) the general emphasis placed on the fight against the terrorist organization "Islamic State", and (5) the negative opinio juris expressed by a myriad of States therefore persuasively argues against the non-intervention principle having fallen into desuetude in this context.
IV. Towards a harmonized "duty of neutrality" during IACs and NIACs?
55. The foregoing sections suggest a remarkable complementarity between both modern practice by third States in their support to belligerent parties in IACs and rebel armed forces in NIACs (or refusal thereof) as well as the relevant legal frameworks. This inevitably begs the question whether taking a holistic approach might provide innovative insights and, perhaps, support some of the trends described and arguments made above.
IV.A. Optional or mandatory?
56. As outlined in section III, some authors still claim that neutrality law is merely optional. It is submitted, however, that neutrality law is automatically triggered when an IAC erupts, leaving no room for a general intermediate legal category of nonbelligerency. This is in line with the principle of non-intervention, of which the legal consequences apply regardless of States deciding to "opt in". A preliminary, but crucial, determination is thus that States have no (lawful) way of shirking international legal obligations related to neutrality-regardless of the type of armed conflict.
IV.B. Non-participation in hostilities 57. With regard to the duty of non-participation in hostilities, the law of neutrality unequivocally prohibits third States from sending their armed forces (including military advisers) to intervene militarily in an IAC, if they want to preserve their neutral status (and enjoy the correlating rights involved). This approach is equally uncontested in NIACs, since the non-intervention principle stipulates that armed intervention against the personality of the State is a violation of international law. It is justifications "contained within the rule itself" actually reinforces rather than weakens that rule. ICJ Nicaragua case, above n.122, para. instead, squarely placed the obligation to ensure international peace and security with the international community of States, represented by the United Nations. It is the UNSC that bears the greatest responsibility in this respect, as it is provided with nearlimitless powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to curb armed violence.
68. However, theory only gets us so far. The events of the past decades and the ubiquity of armed conflicts today have shown, first, that States do wish to influence the outcome of conflicts and, second, that the UNSC more often than not refuses to take decisive action when faced with a conflict situation. As a result, States have sought for creative (but not always accepted) interpretations of international law that would justify their behaviour, by claiming for instance that they could be "non-belligerent"-rather than neutral-in international conflicts, or that providing protective equipment or support which would greatly save civilian lives would not fall within the scope of the non-intervention principle. While a gap between doctrine and practice is thus apparent, the way forward is much less so.
69. In this regard, we want to stress two points. First, neutrality law and the nonintervention principle seem to work in a complementary fashion and, though some differences undoubtedly remain, share a common core and purpose. It is a good example of the coherence, rather than fragmentation of international law. Second, there is no evidence that State practice and opinio juris, properly understood and analysed, have come so far as to change these fundamental doctrines.
70. Additional attention and research should nonetheless be devoted to an even more comprehensive comparison between neutrality law and the principle of nonintervention, since certain elements have not been touched upon (in any depth), e.g., assessing the possible due diligence obligation for third-states to impede the recruitment of rebel forces on their territory as well as the potential duty for such States to capture and intern rebel forces if found on their territory. In addition, it would be useful to monitor any future State practice which could further delineate the distinction between lawful humanitarian support and unlawful military support, and the grey zone in between.
